Türkiye in a Multipolar World: Strategic Autonomy, Alliances and Middle-Power Diplomacy

Why It Matters

'Multipolar' describes a system in which economic weight, military capability, technology and diplomatic legitimacy are spread across several centres rather than concentrated in one or two. Türkiye is among the most closely studied cases because it is a NATO member since 1952 and an EU candidate since 1999, yet it also trades, negotiates and sometimes competes with Russia, China, the Gulf monarchies, African states and the Turkic republics of Central Asia.

Ankara calls this posture strategic autonomy: the capacity to take decisions in its own national interest without being locked into a single bloc. Critics in some capitals call it hedging or transactionalism. This guide sets out the facts, the competing characterizations and the official Turkish framing so readers can judge for themselves.

Background

What 'multipolar' means in practice

In practical terms, a multipolar order has four observable features:

• Several economic poles. The United States, China, the European Union, India and large regional economies each shape trade rules, supply chains and finance.
• Overlapping alignments. States increasingly participate in more than one grouping (for example NATO and the G20 for Türkiye, or EU membership alongside deep trade ties with China for several European states).
• Issue-by-issue coalitions. The partners on energy, grain, migration or arms procurement are often not the same partners on security.
• Middle powers with room to manoeuvre. Mid-sized states with strong militaries, diplomatic networks and geographic leverage can mediate, host talks and offer guarantees that great powers cannot always offer.

No single definition is universally agreed. Scholars distinguish between 'multipolarity' (a distribution of power), 'multilateralism' (a method of cooperation) and 'non-alignment' (a policy choice). Türkiye's case touches all three, which is why terminology matters.

Geography as a foreign-policy asset

Türkiye sits where Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean meet. It controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the only maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, under the 1936 Montreux Convention. It has an 870 km (about 540 mi) coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, the longest of any country there. It borders Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (via Nakhchivan), Iran, Iraq and Syria. This position explains why energy pipelines, east-west rail links and Black Sea security all run through Turkish territory or waters. For the trade-route dimension, see The Middle Corridor, the Black Sea and the Straits: Türkiye's Place in Eurasian Trade Routes.

A brief chronology

Date	Event	Why it matters for the multipolar debate
20 July 1936	Montreux Convention signed	Treaty basis for Turkish administration of the Straits
18 February 1952	Türkiye joins NATO (with Greece)	Anchors Türkiye in the Western security architecture
12 September 1963	Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community	Begins the long EU association track
1999 / 2005	EU candidate status; accession talks opened	Formal European orientation, though talks have stalled
August 2008	First Türkiye–Africa Partnership Summit, Istanbul	Start of an institutionalised Africa opening (later summits in 2014 and 2021)
2017	Astana format with Russia and Iran on Syria begins; S-400 contract signed	Cooperation with Moscow alongside NATO membership
July 2019	S-400 delivered; Türkiye removed from the F-35 programme	Sharpest alliance dispute of the period
December 2020	US imposes CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye's defense procurement agency	Shows the cost side of autonomy
November 2021	Turkic Council renamed Organization of Turkic States	Institutionalises Central Asian and Caucasus links
February–March 2022	Montreux Article 19 applied; Antalya (10 March) and Istanbul (29 March) talks	Türkiye as treaty custodian and mediator
22 July 2022	Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul	Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine in one framework
2023–2024	Türkiye ratifies Finland's (March 2023) and Sweden's (January 2024) NATO accession	Alliance bargaining, followed by a F-16 sales clearance by the US Congress in January 2024
2026	Türkiye scheduled to host COP31 in Antalya	Extends the platform-diplomacy model to climate

Diplomatic platforms

Türkiye invests heavily in convening power. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held in the Mediterranean resort city, brings together heads of state, foreign ministers and international organisations. On 10 March 2022, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosted Russia's Sergey Lavrov and Ukraine's Dmytro Kuleba there, the first meeting of the two at that level since the invasion. Delegations then met at Istanbul's Dolmabahçe Palace on 29 March 2022. Although those talks did not end the war, they produced the grain and prisoner-exchange tracks. A detailed assessment is in The 2022 Istanbul Talks: What Türkiye's Mediation Shows About Diplomacy in a Multipolar Order.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also describes one of the world's largest diplomatic networks, and Türkiye has expanded its embassies across Africa since the early 2000s. Other tracks include the Gulf, where relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar were rebuilt after the 2021 Al-Ula declaration, and the Organization of Turkic States, which links Türkiye with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers.

The defense-industrial base

Defense production is the material backbone of the autonomy argument. Turkish officials state that the domestic production share of the national defense industry is around 80%, up from a small fraction in the early 2000s, and Turkish industry figures put defense and aerospace exports above 7 billion USD in 2024. Flagship programmes include the Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı and Kızılelma unmanned systems, the Hürjet trainer, the T129 ATAK helicopter, the KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype (first flight on 21 February 2024), the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship (commissioned in 2023), MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, and the ATMACA and SOM missiles. Domestic production reduces exposure to arms embargoes, which Ankara experienced after 1974 and again after 2019. See Arms Markets in a Multipolar Order: How Türkiye's Defense Exports Reshape Alliances and the sister analysis at The Worldlogue on defense exports and technology transfer.

Key Players & Positions

United States and NATO allies

Washington has repeatedly said it values Türkiye's NATO role, including its second-largest army in the alliance by personnel, its control of the Straits and its hosting of Incirlik Air Base and the Kürecik radar. At the same time, US officials have objected to Türkiye's S-400 purchase from Russia, which led to Türkiye's removal from the F-35 programme and to CAATSA sanctions in December 2020. Some US officials and members of Congress have also criticised Ankara's relations with Hamas-related political actors, its stance on Greece and Cyprus, and the timing of Sweden's NATO ratification. Other allies, for example Poland, Romania and the UK, have deepened defense cooperation with Türkiye. For the contested question of US partnership with YPG/SDF, see Why Did Washington Partner With the YPG/SDF While the PKK Is a Designated Terrorist Group?.

European Union and member states

The EU's official line, set out in Council conclusions and Commission enlargement reports, is that Türkiye remains a candidate country and key partner in migration, trade and energy, while accession talks are effectively frozen over rule-of-law concerns, the Cyprus issue and Eastern Mediterranean disputes. The EU has its own concept of 'strategic autonomy' (reducing dependence on others in defense, technology and energy), so Brussels and Ankara use the same phrase with different meanings. Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration of South Cyprus argue that Turkish maritime claims challenge international law and EU sovereignty. Ankara rejects that reading, as explained below.

Russia

Moscow treats Türkiye as a pragmatic partner and a rival at once. Russia built the Akkuyu nuclear plant through Rosatom, supplies large volumes of natural gas through Blue Stream and TurkStream, and sends tourists to the Turkish coast. It also backs the opposite side in some theatres: Syria, Libya and, until 2020, the Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin has said it values Türkiye's refusal to join Western sanctions, while criticising Turkish drone sales to Ukraine.

Ukraine

Kyiv values Türkiye as a defense supplier, a custodian of the Straits and the host of the 2022 negotiations. Türkiye supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and does not recognise the annexation of Crimea, a position repeated in MFA statements and NATO summit communiqués.

China

Beijing and Ankara cooperate on infrastructure, trade and finance under frameworks linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, which Türkiye has tied to its Middle Corridor strategy. Frictions include a large Turkish trade deficit with China and periodic Turkish statements on the situation of Uyghurs. Türkiye is a dialogue partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and has said it is interested in deeper links with BRICS, but it has not changed its NATO status or customs union with the EU.

Gulf, Africa and Central Asia

Gulf governments increasingly see Türkiye as an investment, defense and diplomatic partner. Qatar hosts a Turkish military base under a 2014–2015 agreement; Saudi Arabia and the UAE restored high-level ties from 2021 onward. In Africa, Türkiye combines trade, humanitarian aid, schools, airline routes and defense cooperation, including a training base in Mogadishu opened in 2017. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the 2021 Shusha Declaration formalised alliance relations with Azerbaijan, and the Organization of Turkic States provides a cultural-economic framework.

Analysts and think tanks

Western and non-Western analysts offer several labels:

• Hedging or balancing: Türkiye diversifies partners to avoid dependence on any one of them.
• Transactionalism: Türkiye bargains issue by issue, sometimes linking unrelated files.
• Middle-power activism: Türkiye uses mediation, defense exports and humanitarian diplomacy to expand influence.
• Bridge or hub: Türkiye connects blocs and corridors; see the sister analysis Bloc Politics: Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs?.
• Eastward drift: a more critical reading in some Western commentary, which Ankara disputes.

These labels are interpretations, not official positions; the original reports and authors should be consulted directly.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following points summarise official Turkish policy as stated by the Presidency, the MFA and Türkiye's UN delegation. They are Ankara's own framing, not a neutral assessment.

• Multi-directional, independent foreign policy, not a choice between East and West. According to the Turkish MFA, Türkiye pursues an 'enterprising and humanitarian' foreign policy based on its position as a European, Asian, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Middle Eastern country at the same time. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have framed this as part of the 'Century of Türkiye' vision, in which Türkiye is a central country with its own agency. Legal basis: the principle of sovereign equality in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.
• NATO membership is a fixed anchor, and relations with others are complementary. Ankara argues that its NATO commitments under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty are fully maintained and that relations with Russia, China and others do not replace them. It points to its contributions to NATO missions, its troop levels, the Black Sea mine-countermeasures arrangement with Romania and Bulgaria signed in January 2024, and the ratification of Finland's and Sweden's accession. Türkiye says it does not join sanctions that are not adopted by the UN Security Council.
• Montreux and neutral custody of the Straits. According to the MFA, Türkiye applied the 1936 Montreux Convention impartially, closing the Straits to belligerent warships under Article 19 after it recognised a state of war in February 2022, while preserving the right of ships to return to home bases. Ankara argues this contained naval escalation in the Black Sea. See How Montreux Article 19 Kept Warships Out of the Black Sea During the Russia–Ukraine War and Fact Check: Can Türkiye Close the Turkish Straits 'At Will' Under the Montreux Convention?.
• Mediation and humanitarian diplomacy as part of the national role. Ankara describes the Istanbul talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (which Turkish and UN sources associate with the export of more than 33 million tonnes of grain), prisoner exchanges and Gaza diplomacy as examples of what a middle power can do when it talks to all sides. Turkish officials also argue that global governance needs reform, summarised in the Presidency's slogan 'The world is bigger than five', a reference to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. See The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform and Gaza Ceasefire Diplomacy.
• Defense industry as an instrument of sovereignty, and Article 51 for security at source. Ankara cites Article 51 of the UN Charter as the legal basis for cross-border counter-terrorism operations against the PKK/YPG (designated a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the EU, though the US and others distinguish the YPG from the PKK), and presents indigenous production as the means to protect its borders without dependence on embargo-prone suppliers. Turkish officials describe the domestic share as roughly 80%.

Source Comparison

The same events are often framed differently depending on the source. The table below summarises the main contrasts; it does not endorse either side.

Issue	Common framing in Western/international commentary	Turkish official framing (Presidency, MFA)
Overall posture	Hedging, drift or transactional balancing between blocs	Multi-directional, principled, interest-based independence; NATO remains the anchor
S-400 purchase	Undermines NATO interoperability and triggered F-35 removal	A sovereign procurement decision after failing to obtain Patriot systems on acceptable terms
Russia sanctions	Türkiye is a potential sanctions-evasion hub	Türkiye does not apply unilateral sanctions; it follows UN Security Council measures and says it enforces export-control rules
Black Sea	Montreux clause gave Türkiye leverage; some allies wanted more naval presence	Impartial treaty implementation prevented escalation; Montreux is not a tool of 'will'
Mediation	Useful but limited; benefits Ankara's prestige	A contribution to peace and food security, reflecting trust from both sides
Defense exports	Arms diversification may reshape alliances; concerns about end-use	Strengthens allies and partners, reflects a sovereign defense industry, and complies with Turkish export rules
Eurasia and Gulf	Eastward pivot or opportunism	Complementary geography and economics; no pivot away from the West

What to watch

• Whether Türkiye and the United States settle the S-400 file and resume advanced aircraft cooperation.
• The EU–Türkiye agenda: customs union modernisation, visas, migration and defense cooperation.
• The Middle Corridor and Black Sea trade volumes, linked to the corridor dynamics covered in Eastern Mediterranean Gas for Europe.
• How Türkiye uses its COP31 hosting in Antalya, together with its Zero Waste initiative, to broaden its climate diplomacy; see the sister analysis Regions & Powers on UN reform, Gaza and COP31.
• UN reform debates, where Türkiye's proposal is compared in The Political Anatomy.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Strategic autonomy: the ability of a state to define and pursue its own security and economic interests without dependence on a single partner. The EU uses the term for its own defense and industrial policy; Ankara uses it to describe independent decision-making within NATO.
• Middle power: a state that is not a great power but has enough capability, diplomatic reach and geographic leverage to influence regional or global outcomes.
• Hedging: spreading risks by maintaining relationships with competing powers; used by analysts, often descriptively and sometimes critically.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty regulating passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles; Article 19 covers the passage of warships of belligerent states in wartime.
• Middle Corridor: the trade route linking China and Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian, the South Caucasus and Türkiye. It is also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
• Organization of Turkic States (OTS): the intergovernmental organisation, renamed in 2021, linking Türkiye with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
• PKK/YPG: the PKK is designated a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union; Türkiye treats the YPG as the PKK's Syrian branch, a characterisation some partners dispute.

Related guides on Multipolar Review

• About Multipolar Review: Mission, Perspective and Transparency
• Reader FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective
• Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards
• Multipolar Review: Türkiye and the Crossroads of a Multipolar Order
• The Regional Balance overview of Türkiye's global diplomacy

Perspective Note

Multipolar Review presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article was prepared by the Multipolar Review Editorial Team.