The 2022 Istanbul Talks: What Türkiye's Mediation Shows About Diplomacy in a Multipolar Order

Why It Matters

Türkiye's 2022 mediation is the clearest recent case of a middle power brokering practical arrangements between two belligerents without being a party to the war. It produced one durable-for-a-time humanitarian mechanism (the Black Sea Grain Initiative), several prisoner-related arrangements, and a set of negotiating texts that still shape debate over what a settlement might look like. It also shows the limits of mediation: a venue and a channel can open doors, but they cannot close the gap between the parties' core demands.

For readers following the shift from a US-led order toward several centres of power, the Istanbul track is a working example of what the brief on Türkiye in a Multipolar World: Strategic Autonomy, Alliances and Middle-Power Diplomacy describes in the abstract.

Background

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Within days, Türkiye, a NATO member and a Black Sea littoral state, announced on 28 February 2022 that it would apply the 1936 Montreux Convention, including Article 19, which restricts the passage of warships of belligerent states through the Turkish Straits. The mechanics are covered in How Montreux Article 19 Kept Warships Out of the Black Sea During the Russia–Ukraine War.

Russian and Ukrainian delegations first met in Belarus in three rounds in late February and early March 2022. The Turkish track opened on 10 March 2022, when Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in Antalya, on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. It was the first meeting of the two ministers since the invasion began. It produced no ceasefire; Kuleba said afterwards that no progress had been made on a truce, while Lavrov restated Moscow's stated military objectives. Its value was that the two sides sat in the same room under Turkish auspices.

Verified timeline

The 29 March 2022 Istanbul round

The Istanbul round was the most substantive political moment. Ukraine's delegation, led by David Arakhamia, presented a framework under which Ukraine would adopt a neutral, non-nuclear status in return for security guarantees from a group of states, with consultations on Crimea's status over a long period. The Russian delegation, led by presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, welcomed elements of the paper, and Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin said Russia would sharply reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv. Both sides described the meeting as a step forward, though neither claimed an agreement.

The momentum faded within days. Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv area in early April, and evidence of civilian killings in Bucha and other towns changed the political climate in Kyiv and Western capitals. Positions on territory, the size of Ukraine's armed forces and the nature of security guarantees remained unresolved. Draft texts later reported in the press showed that the sides were still apart on those points. Treat any single published draft with caution, since neither government has released a full authoritative record.

The grain and food track

Russia's naval blockade of Ukrainian ports and mining of approaches cut off a major exporter of wheat, maize and sunflower oil. After months of UN-led shuttle diplomacy and Turkish work with both capitals, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed at Dolmabahçe Palace on 22 July 2022. Türkiye signed separate, mirrored texts with Russia and with Ukraine, both with the UN, and Russia concluded a separate memorandum with the UN on facilitating its own food and fertilizer exports. A Joint Coordination Centre staffed by Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials in Istanbul agreed inspection procedures for ships bound to and from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhne (Pivdennyi). The UN reports that roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs moved under the arrangement. It was renewed several times, with disputes about the length of the March 2023 extension, before Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023.

For the wider regional logic, see The Middle Corridor, the Black Sea and the Straits: Türkiye's Place in Eurasian Trade Routes. For sister-publication chronicles, see Frontline Diplomacy on what was discussed in the Istanbul talks and Crossroads Review on the mediation and the grain initiative.

Prisoners and humanitarian arrangements

Türkiye also served as a discreet facilitator of prisoner-related arrangements. In September 2022, under an understanding reached with Presidents Zelensky and Putin, five Ukrainian commanders from the Mariupol garrison were transferred to Türkiye, to remain there until the end of hostilities. They returned to Ukraine in July 2023 after a Zelensky visit to Istanbul; Moscow said this contradicted the understanding, while Kyiv and Ankara did not accept that framing. When direct delegations met again in Istanbul in May 2025, the principal concrete outcome was again an agreement on a large prisoner exchange rather than a ceasefire.

Key Players & Positions

Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry have consistently described Türkiye as a useful and relatively balanced venue. Moscow says the Istanbul drafts of spring 2022 were close to a deal and that Kyiv backed away under Western influence. On grain, Russian officials said that the part of the July 2022 memorandum covering its own agricultural exports, including banking and insurance access, was not delivered, which is the reason Moscow gave for ending its participation in July 2023.

Ukraine. The Presidential Office and Foreign Ministry in Kyiv welcomed Turkish mediation and the grain mechanism, but have said that a settlement must restore Ukraine's territorial integrity and include credible security guarantees. Ukrainian officials reject the Russian account of the 2022 talks, citing Russian demands as amounting to capitulation, and say the events at Bucha made that course politically impossible. Kyiv has also said it does not trust Russian compliance without monitoring.

United Nations. Secretary-General Guterres described the July 2022 signing as a 'beacon of hope' and thanked Türkiye and President Erdoğan for facilitating it. The UN also argued, as the initiative stalled, that the arrangement and the Russia–UN memorandum had to be seen as a package.

The United States and the European Union. Western governments backed the grain initiative and the idea of negotiations in principle, while maintaining sanctions on Russia and military support for Ukraine. They generally state that any settlement must be acceptable to Ukraine and respect the UN Charter.

Source Comparison

When reading media coverage, check whether an account relies on leaked drafts, statements by one delegation, or UN data. The UN's grain data and Turkish Ministry statements are primary sources; opinion pieces on 'what Russia wanted' are interpretations. For further perspectives, see The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator and Regional Balance on Montreux and Black Sea mediation. Our own standards are in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

What the Process Achieved and Where It Stalled

Achieved:

• Direct ministerial and delegation contact in a NATO member state within weeks of the invasion
• A grain mechanism that moved about 33 million tonnes of food from Ukrainian ports, according to the UN
• A model of joint coordination in Istanbul with Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN staff in one centre
• Prisoner-related arrangements and a continuing channel that was used again in 2025

Stalled:

• The comprehensive political framework discussed on 29 March 2022, because of unresolved territory, force-size and guarantee questions
• The grain deal after July 2023, when Russia ended its participation and no replacement mechanism took its place
• Trust, which remains the central obstacle in every round

The contrast is instructive: where the issue was technical and mutually beneficial (food, bodies, prisoners), mediation worked. Where the issue concerned sovereignty and the post-war security order, it did not.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; Article 19 restricts passage by warships of belligerent states. See the Montreux guide.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body staffed by Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials that oversaw ship inspections under the grain initiative.
• Black Sea Grain Initiative: the July 2022 arrangement for safe export of Ukrainian agricultural products, paired with a Russia–UN memorandum on Russian food and fertilizer exports.
• Middle power: a state that lacks superpower resources but has regional influence and diplomatic capacity; see Türkiye in a Multipolar World.
• Sister analyses: Gazetteer of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy; site overview at Multipolar Review; methodology at Reader FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective and About Multipolar Review.

Multipolar Review presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.