What Is the Organization of Turkic States and What Does It Mean for Eurasia?

Why It Matters

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an intergovernmental body that links Türkiye with four Turkic-speaking Eurasian republics, with Hungary, Turkmenistan and the Turkish Cypriot State holding observer status. It matters because it sits on the Caspian–Caucasus–Central Asia land bridge, where trade, energy and security interests of Russia, China, the EU and the United States all overlap.

In short: the OTS is a consultative, project-driven forum rather than a defence pact. Whether it becomes a major Eurasian actor depends mainly on transport corridors, investment and political coordination, not on military integration.

Background

The OTS has a three-decade institutional history that moved from summits, to a council, to a formal organisation.

• 1992: Türkiye hosted the first Summit of Heads of State of Turkic-Speaking Countries in Ankara, following the independence of the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Summits then continued periodically.
• 1993: TURKSOY, the international organisation for Turkic culture, was founded (Almaty; headquartered in Ankara).
• 2009: On 3 October 2009, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Türkiye signed the Nakhchivan Agreement, creating the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, commonly called the Turkic Council, with a secretariat in Istanbul.
• 2018: Hungary became an observer at the Cholpon-Ata summit in Kyrgyzstan.
• 2019: Uzbekistan became a full member at the Baku summit.
• 2021: At the Istanbul summit of 12 November 2021, leaders renamed the Turkic Council the Organization of Turkic States, adopted the Turkic World Vision 2040 document, and granted Turkmenistan observer status.
• 2022: At the Samarkand summit, the Turkish Cypriot State was admitted as an observer.

Around the council sit affiliated institutions, including the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA, Baku), the Turkic Academy (Astana), the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation (Baku) and business and investment platforms. Formal membership and observer lists can change, so readers should confirm the current position on the organisation's official website.

Members and observers

What the OTS actually does

• Trade and investment: Customs and trade-facilitation dialogue, business councils and a Turkic investment initiative agreed at leaders' level. The OTS is not a customs union and has no common external tariff.
• Transport and connectivity: Support for multimodal links across the Caspian, the South Caucasus and Anatolia, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (opened 2017) and the wider Middle Corridor. See The Middle Corridor, the Black Sea and the Straits: Türkiye's Place in Eurasian Trade Routes.
• Culture, education and language: Heritage programmes, academic exchanges and technical work on harmonising the Latin-based alphabets used by Turkic languages.
• Security consultation: Meetings of officials on emergencies, border and customs cooperation, and regional developments. There is no mutual-defence obligation comparable to NATO's Article 5.

Key Players & Positions

Member and observer governments

Each participant approaches the OTS through its own priorities, and Turkic identity is only one factor.

• Azerbaijan treats the OTS as a platform for diplomatic support and for East–West transit; it works closely with Türkiye bilaterally, including under the 2021 Shusha Declaration on allied relations.
• Kazakhstan pursues a declared multi-vector foreign policy. It is a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and CSTO, and also hosts the Turkic Academy.
• Kyrgyzstan is likewise in both the Eurasian Economic Union and CSTO and uses the OTS for investment and cultural ties.
• Uzbekistan joined in 2019 as part of a regional opening under its current leadership, while keeping balanced ties with Russia and China.
• Hungary, an EU and NATO member, joined as an observer under its 'Eastern Opening' policy, which seeks economic ties across Eurasia.
• Turkmenistan, which maintains permanent neutrality recognised by the UN General Assembly, participates only as an observer.
• The Turkish Cypriot State holds observer status. The Greek Cypriot administration and Greece, as EU members, have objected to this.

Outside powers

• Russia: Moscow has generally avoided open hostility, cooperating with the same states in the Eurasian Economic Union and CSTO. Some Russian commentators voice concern that Turkic identity politics could affect Russia's own Turkic-speaking regions, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and its influence in Central Asia.
• China: Beijing's priority is the Belt and Road Initiative and its own China–Central Asia summit format. It has not treated the OTS as a threat, but the grouping's cultural affinity with Turkic peoples, including Uyghurs in Xinjiang, makes the topic sensitive. Member governments have avoided turning it into a confrontation with Beijing.
• EU and the United States: Western governments largely view the OTS as a legitimate regional forum and an avenue to diversify transit routes away from Russia. Analysts attached to Western think tanks vary between treating it as a practical connectivity project and as a vehicle for increased Turkish and Azerbaijani influence.

Source Comparison

The same facts, such as a summit declaration or a rail project, are framed differently depending on who reports them.

Commentary labelled 'pan-Turkism' often reads cultural cooperation as political ambition. Turkish and member-state documents, by contrast, stress sovereignty, consensus and economic content. Readers should compare declarations with actual implementation: investment funds, rail throughput and customs agreements are verifiable, while claims of a coming 'Turkic army' are not supported by any founding text. For similar comparisons on Türkiye's balancing role, see Bloc Politics: Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs? and, on defence cooperation, Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry. Our sourcing approach is set out in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Turkic Council: The 2009–2021 name of the organisation, formally the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States.
• Nakhchivan Agreement: The 3 October 2009 treaty that created the Council.
• Turkic World Vision 2040: The strategic document adopted at the 2021 Istanbul summit.
• Observer status: Participation in meetings without full membership rights or decision-making votes.
• Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route): The multimodal trade route linking China and Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian, the South Caucasus and Türkiye.
• Multi-vector foreign policy: Balancing relations with several powers, common in Central Asia.

Related reading on Multipolar Review: The Middle Corridor, the Black Sea and the Straits; Türkiye in a Multipolar World; Arms Markets in a Multipolar Order; and About Multipolar Review.

Published by the Multipolar Review Editorial Team.

Multipolarreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.