Arms Markets in a Multipolar Order: How Türkiye's Defense Exports Reshape Alliances

Why It Matters

Türkiye's defense exports matter because they show how a NATO member with a growing domestic industry is turning arms sales into a diplomatic tool in a world with more than two or three poles. For buyers, Turkish systems offer an alternative to a small group of traditional suppliers whose licensing rules can change with politics. For critics, the same exports raise questions about export controls, end-use monitoring and conflict dynamics. This guide treats exports as diplomacy, not a catalog, and keeps the factual record separate from Ankara's own assessment.

It deliberately avoids contract values and market-share statistics. Many deals are confidential, figures are often reported inconsistently, and this publication follows its Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards in omitting numbers it cannot verify.

Background

From dependence to a national industry

Türkiye's defense-industrial push has a clear political origin: periods when allied supply was interrupted. After the 1974 Cyprus crisis the United States imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye (1975–1978). Turkish officials and analysts have long cited that episode as a formative lesson in the risks of dependence on a single source. In 1985 Ankara created a dedicated procurement and industrial-development agency, which after the 2018 move to the presidential system became the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), attached to the Presidency of the Republic.

Turkish officials say that domestic content in the national defense industry has reached roughly 80 percent; this figure is an official claim, and independent measurement methods differ. A fuller treatment is available in Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How Domestic Production Reached About 80% and What It Means, and the security rationale is outlined in Polity Review: Neutralizing Terrorism at Its Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine and Defense Industry.

Why combat use became a showcase

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the Bayraktar TB2, were used in Turkish counter-terrorism operations in Syria and northern Iraq, and later by partners in Libya, in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war on Azerbaijan's side, and by Ukraine from 2022. Operational visibility, whatever one thinks of the conflicts concerned, gave Turkish systems a reputation that marketing alone rarely achieves. Other items in the portfolio, among them the Akıncı and Aksungur UAVs, the Hürjet trainer and light combat aircraft, the MİLGEM corvette and frigate family, the SOM and ATMACA missiles, and the HİSAR and SİPER air-defense programs, are more recent or still entering service.

Selected timeline

Key Players & Positions

Buyers and partners: diversification as hedging

Buyers in every region cite similar reasons for looking beyond a small set of traditional suppliers, though each government speaks for itself and publishes little. Common drivers include:

• Speed and availability. Turkish production lines have often delivered faster than larger exporters facing backlogs.
• Political predictability. Governments worried about licensing delays, end-use conditions or parliamentary holds in supplier states view an additional source as insurance.
• Price-to-capability balance. Qualitatively, Turkish systems are often positioned between premium Western platforms and cheaper alternatives, though exact comparisons depend on configuration.
• Industrial participation. Offers of co-production, local assembly or maintenance hubs appeal to states building their own defense bases.
• Diversified relationships. In a multipolar environment, governments increasingly avoid reliance on one bloc for security hardware.

The pattern differs by region:

These are reported patterns, not an exhaustive or independently audited list. Readers should consult buyer governments, SIPRI and national arms-export reports where available.

Traditional suppliers and allies

The United States remains both a supplier and a critic. Washington's removal of Türkiye from the F-35 program in 2019 and the 2020 CAATSA sanctions over the Russian S-400 system reflect US law and its stated concerns about interoperability and Russian technology within NATO. At the same time, US approval of F-16 modernization and sales in January 2024 shows a mixed, transactional relationship. European governments differ widely: some partner with Turkish firms, others tightened controls after the 2019 operation in northern Syria. For the wider alliance context, see Bloc Politics: Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs? NATO Membership, Eurasian Ties and Strategic Autonomy.

Export-control criticisms

Governments and civil-society organizations have raised several recurring concerns:

• Use in contested conflicts. Canada's 2020–2021 permit suspension followed reports that Canadian-made targeting cameras were used on drones in Nagorno-Karabakh. Several European states restricted sales after Operation Peace Spring in 2019.
• Arms embargoes. United Nations expert panels reported violations of the UN arms embargo on Libya (Security Council Resolution 1970 of 2011, later strengthened) by several outside actors, Türkiye among them. Türkiye denies wrongdoing and says its support was provided at the request of Libya's internationally recognized government under bilateral agreements.
• End-use monitoring. Human-rights groups argue that exporters should publish more on buyer vetting, particularly for drones sold to states with documented civilian-harm concerns.
• Components and dependence. Turkish systems have at times used foreign-made engines, optics or electronics, which gives third-country suppliers leverage. Turkish programs have therefore prioritized replacing such parts with domestic ones.
• Transparency. Critics say that Türkiye's publicly available export reporting is less detailed than that of some other exporters; Ankara says it complies with its international obligations.

Türkiye takes part in the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime, and readers should check the UN treaty collection for its current Arms Trade Treaty status, since publicly available summaries differ.

Source Comparison

Coverage of Turkish defense exports varies sharply by source type. Western press often highlights battlefield performance and export-control disputes. Turkish official sources emphasize self-reliance, partnership and the right of states to defend themselves. Industry sources stress capabilities and delivery milestones. Each is useful, none is neutral.

On technology transfer and alliance diplomacy, the sister publication analysis The Worldlogue: Defense Exports and Technology Transfer: How Türkiye's Industry Shapes Its Alliance Diplomacy gives complementary detail.

What to watch

• Industrial partnerships in Europe. Whether arrangements like the Baykar–Leonardo framework deepen and survive political cycles.
• Fifth-generation and air-defense programs. KAAN, Hürjet, SİPER and HİSAR-O are likely to test whether Türkiye can export higher-end systems rather than mainly unmanned and naval ones.
• Component sovereignty. Domestic engines and sensors would reduce the leverage that third-country export licenses give foreign capitals.
• Africa and the Gulf. Security cooperation tied to trade, infrastructure and diplomacy, including in the Horn of Africa.
• Corridors and trade. Defense cooperation increasingly overlaps with logistics and trade links, discussed in The Middle Corridor, the Black Sea and the Straits: Türkiye's Place in Eurasian Trade Routes and with Turkic-state ties in What Is the Organization of Turkic States and What Does It Mean for Eurasia?.
• Transparency standards. Any move by Ankara toward more detailed public export reporting would address a common critique.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Defense diplomacy: The use of training, exercises, sales and joint production to build political relationships. Turkish arms sales often come bundled with such elements.
• Strategic autonomy: A state's ability to make security choices without being bound to one patron. For Türkiye's wider approach, read Türkiye in a Multipolar World: Strategic Autonomy, Alliances and Middle-Power Diplomacy.
• Multipolar order: An international system with several significant centers of power, not one or two. Buyers in such a system tend to diversify partners.
• Export control: National licensing of arms and dual-use items, including end-use certification. Rules differ by country and by regime membership (for example Wassenaar or the Arms Trade Treaty).
• End-use monitoring: Checks that exported equipment is used for the stated purposes. Practices vary widely among exporters.
• CAATSA: The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, used in December 2020 against SSB.
• SSB: The Presidency of Defense Industries, Türkiye's procurement and industrial-policy body.
• PKK/YPG: The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Türkiye regards the YPG as its Syrian extension, a point explained in Why Did Washington Partner With the YPG/SDF While the PKK Is a Designated Terrorist Group?. This dispute is a major factor in debates over Western arms policy toward Türkiye.

For how this site works and how perspective is labeled, see About Multipolar Review: Mission, Perspective and Transparency and the Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards. For border-security context, see Interstate Journal: Türkiye, Syria and Refugees: Border Security and the Hosting Burden.

Multipolar Review presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. Prepared by the Multipolar Review Editorial Team.